THE MYTH OF QUINTUS MUCIUS SCAEVOLA:
FOUNDING FATHER OF LEGAL SCIENCE?
by KAIUS TUORI (Helsinki)* , ** It is a truth universally acknowledged that reading general introductions about matters relating to one's own field of interest reveals surprising facts. In a recent introduction to the history of legal interpretation from Antiquity to the present day, the birth and development of Western legal science is credited to Quintus Mucius Scaevola Pontifex (c. 140-82 BC), Roman consul for the year 95 BC. We learn that he established Roman jurisprudence as a distinct science and thus caused a revolutionary change in Western jurisprudence. Intellectual rigour, rationalisation, and organisation raised Roman jurists to the level of professional lawyers and gave jurisprudence the status of science 1985, p. 163, 168-171. know that he is the father of the Western legal tradition? What is this legal tradition they are talking about?
The purpose of this article is to analyse the different threads of the tradition woven around Quintus Mucius Scaevola Pontifex (hereafter Quintus Mucius), statesman, old Roman hero, leading jurist and the supposed founder of the science of law. This inquiry is divided into three parts. First I aim to present the Roman layers of evidence concerning the life and works of Quintus Mucius. Secondly, the interpretative tradition formed through centuries of legal historiography is introduced. Finally, an alternative interpretation of the preceding material is advanced.
If we are to examine whether a historical person originated a tradition that has continued unto the present day, we should first decide on a matter of definition: what kind of science are we looking for? In our case, there are essentially two options. The first is that we should deduce how the Romans defined legal science as compared to mere jurisprudence. This can further be divided into two additional questions: how the Romans themselves defined it 5 and how modern researchers have reconstructed the Roman conception 6 ? The second option embraces the Roma, Labeo, 1 (1955) Rechtsgeschiedenis, 23 (1955) , p. 1-20. Giaro attacks as anachronistic neopositivism even the concept of science used by Horak, because all attempts at proving the scientific nature of Roman jurisprudence only mirror what the observer deems to be scientific. Giaro himself thinks that the Roman jurists could not care less whether their activities could be considered scientific or not; T.
